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Economic behavior begins and ends in the brain. Like economics, astronomy is
about complex systems composed of simpler components— double stars, solar systems,
planets and their satellites. While astronomical theories abstract from detailed
descriptions of stars and planets, these theories are also sharply constrained by lower-
level concepts from chemistry and physics, like Newtonian mechanics and gravity. In a
similar way, economics should be constrained by facts about how people think, feel and
behave. Behavioral economics takes this constraint seriously-- very seriously—and
grounds economic models in psychological regularity. 
This essay is about what behavioral economics has established, what the new
research frontiers are, and what can be said about welfare and consequently about policy. 
The idea that people are boundedly rational has been around for a long time (e.g.,
Herb Simon) and is not in genuine dispute. Since Simon defined bounds on rationality as
the antithesis of hyperrationality, and hyperrationality was never taken seriously as a
cognitive model, the concept of bounded rationality should not be controversial. The
debate is therefore not about whether people are hyper-rational or not. The debate is
about precisely how ideas from psychology can inform economic models of savings,
unemployment, consumer demand, market-clearing, organizational design, financial
market fluctuations, economic growth, and so on. Furthermore, rational outcomes can be
the limiting behavior of systems in which people (or organizations) learn, imitate, and
seek advice, which are all psychological concepts originating in the brain.  
Behavioral economists have been actively and carefully researching how to
usefully complicate models based on rationality, by incorporating Simonian bounds, for
more than a decade or two. (I’ll speak presumptuously on behalf of “the field” starting
here, and throughout, since the conference organizers asked me to.
i) 
The growth rate of behavioral economics, as a serious alternative to models
rooted in strong rationality, has been more like a rocket launch, building up a powerful
thrust for years and suddenly taking off vertically, than a smooth ascent of an airplane.
Now we are in takeoff phase and aren’t sure how far the rocket can go or in which
direction. But the flight is sure to change economics profoundly and for the better. 3
Behavioral economists believe in the usefulness of a few central principles. We
know that people value changes from reference points (but know less about what points
of reference are, and how multiple gains and losses from reference points are integrated),
that expressed preferences are constructed much as people heuristically approximate
solutions to problems (but have no parsimonious alternative to utility-maximization so
far), that categories of wealth are not added up when people make spending decisions
(but would like to know more about the detailed cognitive structure of their “mental
accounting” of wealth categories). These distinctions provide a new set of questions that
will be answered, eventually, in a phase of behavioral economics that  should be
(happily) Kuhnian “normal science”. 
A collateral contribution of the behavioral economics enterprise is to remind
economists how little is truly known about the basic facts needed to shape policy. Is
privatizing Social Security good? It depends on whether forcing saving is better than
allowing unfettered choice among a wide range of choices (perhaps too many); we don’t
know. The fact that widely-used graduate textbooks “prove” that more choice is preferred
to less— merely by assuming that preferences are complete-- should not be taken too
seriously as a guide for policy without further corroboration and thought.  
Does current drug policy correctly internalize public externalities from drug use,
or perhaps implement a nearly-harmless paternalism, and balance social cost and benefit?
We don’t know, absent a sensible theory of choice about substances that people become
addicted to.  
These examples suggest that behavioral economics can also contribute much more
when a dialogue with policymakers is created which poses specific questions that can
answered by what we know from psychology, and points research in policy-relevant
directions which we don’t pretend to have answers to but which are undeniably
important.   
To stick close to the challenge of stated themes, the paper is organized around
questions posed by the conference organizers. I also add a few more questions which are
those that behavioral economists are currently asking.4
I. How does research by psychologists and other behavioral scientists
challenge the economist’s model of individual decision making?
Table 1 lists some of the central building blocks in economic analysis. These
principles are taught (often implicitly) in every required graduate course. Some
combination of these assumptions, along with assumptions about institutional rules for
determining prices and allocations, underlie most of what economists do. 
Table 1: Building blocks of economic theory and behavioral alternatives
Rational-choice assumption Behavioral alternative
Complete, transitive, smooth preferences constructed preferences
    over risks (EU, SEU) prospect theory
uncertainty-aversion
case-based
    over time b-d
multiple systems (e.g. hot-cold)
internalities (habits, preference for increases)
Dynamic programming heuristics (a la chess)
Preferences are “asocial” herding, cascades
Bayesian updating quasi-Bayesian
separation of belief, value   wishful thinking, self-serving bias       
separation of prior, likelihood   encoding bias
Self-interest social utilities
Profit-maximization trial-and-error adjustment
Market-clearing nonprice rationing (e.g., queues, nepotism)
wage-price stickiness





Portfolio view decision isolation
Fungibility mental accounting
Basic building blocks of economic theory
Virtually all economic analyses rely on combinations of these assumptions.
ii Each
assumption is a simplification and hence permits counterexamples (or “anomalies”). The5
point of behavioral economics is not to produce anomalies, but to create new theory
inspired by those anomalies.
At this point, it is useful to reminder the reader about the basic steps in the
historical point-counterpoint debate between behavioral and rational-choice economics
about how empirical weakness in rationality assumptions should be evaluated. Some of
the most frequently-asked questions which have been largely asked and answered over
the years are collected in an FAQ Appendix at the end of the paper. 
The first line of defense: “as if”
The standard defense of rationality assumptions is that people may not explicitly
calculate as the theory implicitly assumes, but they act “as if” they do. The “as if” mantra
has been repeated so often in defense of rational modelling that it is easy to loose track of
what it really means: Namely, that a theory which refuses to specify a detailed cognitive
mechanism by which rational choice is achieved is inherently incomplete. Possible
mechanisms which could lead to rational choice include natural or cultural selection
against limited-rationality, less-rational agents buying advice (e.g., financial planning)
which leads to more rational choice, and learning from experience or imitation of more-
successful (and presumably more-rational) agents. 
Rational-choice theory could be completed, rather than relying on the incomplete
“as if” defense, by investigating the conditions under which these mechanisms lead to
rational behavior or don’t. Behavioral economics is about completing the theory by
specifying more detailed mechanisms grounded in psychological regularity. Most
analyses of that sort show that rational outcomes are not guaranteed by plausible details
of these theoretically-unspecified mechanisms (e.g., Russell and Thaler, 1985). 
The subconscious line of defense: Normative and descriptive
There is a subconcious line of defense for rational modelling which is mentioned
surprisingly rarely. Most rational models are normative by definition—weighting future
rewards other than exponentially is misforecasting one’s own future behavior
iii; updating
probabilities according to Bayes’ rule is sensible; and smoothing consumption over one’s
life cycle is the only way to satisfy certain appealing axioms.  But why should normative6
models be privileged as the most likely descriptions of behavior? One explanation is that
academic economists gravitate toward these assumptions because they seem descriptive
of their own behavior—either that’s why they chose to study economics rather than
physics or sociology in the first place or, once drawn into the discipline, the assumptions
begin to sound plausible because of acculturation. In any case, academic economists who
succeed and shape prevailing thought are likely to be or think more foresightfully (buying
costly education to gain future wages) and analytically than average folks, and to be more
persuaded by t-statistics than anecdote, rhetoric, and popular opinion. These academics
projecting their own tastes and skills on to the general population is a kind of “projection
bias” or “curse of knowledge” (cites).
Aren’t approximations useful? 
The precision of rational modelling inherently implies that such models are
simplified approximations. There is no doubt among behavioral economists that rational
modelling is often a useful approximation (an issue cogently raised by Roth, 19xx, but
anticipated from the start by behavioral economists). The usefulness of rationality as an
approximation never was, is not now, and never will be a matter of debate; so it is a waste
of time to frame the debate in those terms. The critiques of rationality and the interest in
anomalies are not meant to heckle the rational model by showing its imperfections—
since we know well that all models have are simplifications and hence permit
counterexamples (including behavioral anomalies). Instead, the critiques are designed to
point toward new alternative theories and constructs.
So the only question is whether behavioral economics can complicate the rational
model in a way that is parsimonious, useful and fruitful. As Mullainathan and Thaler,
200?)  point out, relaxing perfect rationality assumptions is a natural step in progress in
economic modelling after relaxing perfect competition and perfect information. Both of
those two “perfect”’s are useful, and are therefore still used in introductory teaching to
illustrate basic principles (because models based on them are easy to grasp, and
informative). But they are also looked back on by modern researchers as quaint, like a
Model T car or early fax machines
iv, compared to the souped-up models of game-7
theoretic competition and signaling that are routinely taught and used today. Hopefully
we will someday—soon-- look back on perfect rationality in the same way. 
There is also no doubt that having models which operate at fundamentally
different levels and are only weakly linked can be useful. For example, microfoundations
of macroeconomics (e.g., growth theory). ; it is hard to build up aggregate demand curves
from individual ones (Sonnenschein) or social utility functions from individual ones
(Condorcet, Arrow). But the advantage of weak linkage should not be an excuse for
ignoring any possible inspiration and empirical discipline from a “lower level” model.  If
it makes sense to complicate a higher-level model, like models of life-cycle savings or
asset price changes, by considering alternative assumptions about lower-level
assumptions about individual behavior, then the first place to look should be evidence
from fields that study these phenomena carefully at the lower level (e.g., patterns of
discounting of cash flows by humans and other animals, or evidence of mistakes in
forecasting a time series of earnings). 
The promise of the “as if” approach is that theories based on approximate
mechanisms—i.e., assumptions that are technically false-- might still make good
predictions. But theories based on strong rationality assumptions have *not* always made
especially good predictions. Much of this is the familiar half-full/half-empty debate:
Rational theories are not unreasonable, but in every major field of economics there are
large puzzles which have not been resolved by decades of debate. Behavioral alternatives
have the advantage of being better-grounded in regularity and being able to potentially
explain these puzzles. Good science is progressive, which is precisely the idea that
expanding theories to explain regularities that puzzling from the point of view of
previous theorizing is progress.
Here are some examples: The assumption that wealth categories are fungible (or
compiled into a net worth figure) is violated by clear evidence that marginal propensities
to consume vary with wealth categories (Shefrin-Thaler). Market-clearing theories of
labor supply cannot explain unemployment. In macroeconomics, there is no consensus
about why there are business cycles and why prices and wages are so sticky (especially as
the technology for rapidly changing prices and wages has advanced rapidly). In finance,
the debate about whether markets are informationally efficient is more unsettled than ever8
(even though there are literally about 100 million observations of  daily stock prices
widely available on the CRSP tapes); and the chronic poor performance and proliferation
of mutual funds has not been clearly explained. In corporate finance and business
strategy, it is well-established that firms often destroy stockholder value with optimistic
mergers, especially when poorly governed; but why is governance so poor? In studies of
life-cycle savings, it is not known why people in modern America save so little, and why
consumption is so smooth and drops sharply upon retirement (which it should not if
people plan for retirement). 
My point is not that behavioral economics can clearly resolve all these puzzles
rapidly— we can’t, yet. The point is just that defending “as if” rationality assumptions,
on the basis that their predictions can be surprisingly accurate, is severely undermined by
the plain fact that many of the predictions are clearly wrong.  
II. How should we amend our views of individual consumption and
investment decisions?
The right side of Table 1 lists alternatives to the conventional rational choice
principles on the left side of the table. The profession has not achieved a consensus on
which of these principles are most realistic or analytically fruitful. The point of the table
is that a lot of progress has been made rapidly in suggesting some formal alternatives
which extend rationality principles to explain anomalies. 
Most of the alternatives are extensions of conventional models which add a
parameter or two or suggest new types of functions. These extensional models are useful
because they include rationality as a boundary or limiting case; and they lead naturally to
econometric tests in which the “amount” of limited rationality can be precisely estimated
in the form of parameter values. For examples, models of hyperbolic discounting extend
exponential (i.e., dynamically consistent) discounting by adding a preference for
immediacy, codified by a parameter b. When b=1 the theory reduces to exponential
discounting. Empirical estimates of b then give an idea of “how irrational” (or present-
biased) people are. 
Another example is social utility functions which assume that people care about
their own payoffs, plus weights a on “envy” (earning less than others) and b on “guilt”9
(earning more than others), which have proved useful in explaining regularities in
bargaining and public goods contribution (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fehr and Gächter,
2000). When a=b=0 players are self-interested. Measuring values of a and b therefore
provides a sharp metric for how much of a simplification self-interest is and,
consequently, how much is gained by extending the self-interest assumption. 
Unlike hyperbolic discounting and envy-guilt theories, many of the alternative
theories listed on the right side of Table 1 have not yet been sanded and polished into
clearly specified theories that can be taken to data. But there is every reason to think that
sort of formalization will happen rapidly and prove useful. 
III. What more do we need to know? 
One way to think about policy is to ask what we need to know before we can
make prescriptions. There are at least three hotly-debated topics which lie at the core of
policy debates and are now active areas of research in behavioral economics (or should
be): Field tests, self-awareness, endogeneous institutions, missing psychology, and
neuroscience.
Field tests: Early evidence in behavioral economics came largely from laboratory
experiments. Experiments are particularly useful for ruling out alternative explanations.
For example, if we observed people in the field keeping the cars they bought or spouses
they married, even if they grew dissatisfied, we can’t be sure whether they exhibit an
endowment effect or the transactions costs of switching are large. So Knetsch (cite) ran
experiments in which subjects are given a good randomly (e.g., a chocolate bar or pen)
and allowed to switch. The transactions costs were made as low as possible—an
experimenter would pick the chocolate bar off their desk, if the subject wanted, and plunk
down a pen, or vice versa. Most subjects still stick with what they were endowed with,
which rules out the economic transaction cost explanation. A true believer would stretch
the definition of transaction costs to include a psychic transaction cost-- which is right
where we want them, on behavioral territory, since this relabelling begs the question of
which giving something up is psychically costly. 
Now that so many persistent anomalies have been demonstrated experimentally,
and shown to be robust to incentives, repetition, educational background, and so forth, it10
is useful to switch to looking for these effects in field. In fact, field evidence has been
slowly accumulating for some time (particularly since the late 1980s). Evidence of
asymmetric consumer responses to price changes, reluctance to sell large losing assets
(stocks and houses), sensitivity of New York cab drivers to daily income targets, strong
preferences for low-probability lotteries, and overreaction of markets to stocks with bad
returns (among others; see Camerer, 2000, for a summary) are all consistent with
phenomena established earlier in the lab-- reference-dependence, decision isolation,
overweighting of low probabilities, and failure to expect regression toward the mean. 
The latest studies are even better because they often compare rational-choice
predictions with behavioral alternatives more sharply. They have shown the power of
defaults in determining pension allocations (Madrian et al), b-d discounting in savings
(Laibson et al),  and mistakes in forecasting future health-club use (della Vigna and
Malmendier). In each case, it is possible to tell a complicated (perhaps cockamamie)
rational-choice “story” of why the established regularity exists. But doing so in an ad hoc
way for each regularity, undermines the claim for parsimony that rational choice theorists
are so rightly proud of. In any case, more studies of this sort are needed and many are on
the way. Some will disprove earlier behavioral explanations or establish limits that the
earlier experimental data would not have anticipated. That’s fine with us because we care
about finding out how the economy works rather than foolishly defending a faith.  
Field studies are particularly useful for establishing the boundaries of phenomena
and their practical importance. For example, if people have an exaggerated distaste for
giving up goods they own or consumption patterns they are used to—the “endowment
effect” shown by Knetsch’s experiments (Thaler, 1980; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler,
1990; cf. Plott and Zeiler, 2003)--, the question arises of whether the experience of
buying and selling over a lifetime will diminish any such endowment effect. For
example, if the endowment effect is due to misforecasting how badly one will feel after
losing a good, as I suspect it does, people may learn that life goes on and quit
misforecasting. Indeed, studies comparing amateur and experienced (active) traders of
sports paraphernalia showed that more experienced traders show no endowment effect for
the goods they regularly trade (List QJE in press). Furthermore, experienced traders of
paraphernalia show smaller endowment effects for everyday goods used in lab studies11
than novice traders, as if the experience of buying and selling spills over to minimize
aversion to losses of everyday goods (List, 2003).  Our study of cab drivers showed that
more experienced drivers did not show the distaste for falling short of a target that
inexperienced drivers did (Camerer et al, 1997). These facts are raw material for
refinements: An appropriately rich theory should explain when phenomena like
endowment effects exist, and when they don’t. Learning over the life cycle that losses
aren’t so bad is one candidate for how effects shrink over time, but there is plenty of
other room for other variables like advertising, education, and so forth. 
Finally, field studies are useful because they permit sharp empirical showdowns.
They force behavioral economists to be very precise about what their models predict.
And they also force rational-choice theorists to be precise about what sorts of evidence
would unequivocally refute predictions based on rationality.
v  
Self-awareness: Economic theorists who are (over?)trained to think about
rational choice instinctively think that even if people make mistakes, they must be aware
of those mistakes. This presumption leads immediately to meta-rational model in which
people are self-aware about their limits and strive to overcome them (sometimes called
“sophistication” in the intertemporal-choice research).
It is certainly useful to explore the implications of models of this sort based on
self-awareness.
vi But it is not the only path. 
To a psychologist, the idea of human self-awareness is closely related to the
“homunculus fallacy”. The homunculus is an idealized “creature” in the brain which
behaves optimally—a brain-endowed creature within the brain which has “executive
control”. In cognitive science, it is considered an embarassing failure to include a
homunculus as a cheap short-cut to explain behavior because positing a homunculus
creates a recursive problem: Does the homunculus have a brain? And if so, does *that*
brain have an even tinier homunculus? And what about *that* homunculus’s brain? Ad
infinitum. Assuming self-awareness creates a homunculus problem and as a result,
cognitive scientists are much less inclined to quickly work toward presume self-
awareness than some modern economic theorists are. 
Furthermore, many examples of behavior suggest limited self-awareness. (An
economist might model this as the brain having separate functions which interact; but no12
single homunculistic function understands all those interactions.) A famous example of
limited self-awareness is the behavior of split-brain patients—patients whose “corpus
callosum” (the thin band of tissue connecting the left and right hemispheres) have been
severed, usually to prevent epileptic fits from spreading from one hemisphere to another.
It is well-known that language comprehension and recognition are normally located in the
left hemisphere (Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas). It is also well-known that if you see an
image on the left part of a screen, that image is seen by the left eye but processed in the
right side of the brain. Suppose you show a split-brain patient a screen which says
“wave” on the left side, and ask the patient to do what the screen says to do. Patients will
wave their hand. The right side of the brain sees the instruction and instructs the right
hand to wave. 
Now you ask the patient *why* she waved. The left hemisphere (the language
area) has to think up a verbal answer and say it. Often subjects say “Well, I saw
somebody I know and waved to them”. We know this explanation is wrong but the brain
is so overtrained to make sense of behavior that the language area picks words which
make sense to “it” (the left hemisphere). Other patients say “I don’t know”—what they
mean is “I, the left side, don’t know”. The left side literally doesn’t know what the right
side was doing. 
This example shows that we might *act* as if we are self-aware, but “we” (the
patients’ left sides) are just making it up—rationalizing. The human brain is like a
monkey brain with a press secretary. The fact that an apparently-self-aware explanation is
so typically given by the press secretary suggests that much of our faith in self-awareness
is illusory and should be taken skeptically. As they say in neuroscience, “Don’t ask the
person; ask the brain”. 
These split-brain patients are exceptional but there are many other examples of
this sort of failure of self-awareness. For example, show normal subjects a smiling or
frowning face very rapidly (30 milliseconds) followed by a neutral-face “mask”. Most
subjects say they have no idea whether saw a smiling or frowning face initially. They
aren’t lying or holding back—“they” (their cortex which grasps for an answer) truly
doesn’t know. But if you measure movements of facial muscles (cheekbones for smiling
and between the eyebrows for frowning) the muscle movements are correlated with the13
type of face seen in the initial 30 msec exposure; the person who saw a happy face
smiled, and the person who saw a sad face frowned, but this rapid emotional processing
does not reach the press secretary in the cortex. So the face knows but the “person”-- i.e,
the cortex which tries to interpret signals from elsewhere in the brain-- doesn’t. 
One might argue that the problem here is simply rapidity of exposure. It’s true that in
most economic decisions, people have longer to deliberate and process information than 30
milliseconds. But they are also dealing with much more complex stimuli. It is not clear that
having longer to think about how much to save, whether to quit a job, and so forth will
necessarily produce self-awareness about all the brain activity which determined the decision. It
might be, as in the split-brain patients, that some rapid motor or emotional activity quickly
“decides” and the cortex spends some time rationalizing or trying to figure why the emotions
decided what they did. For example, it is well-established that political affiliations are highly-
correlated across generations (cite). But if you ask a young Republican, “Why do you vote
Republican?” she typically won’t say, “Because my Dad did”. More likely he will (a) create a
plausible tale about ideology, liking or disliking particular candidates, fiscal irresponsibility of
government, a fetus’s right to life, and so on. It may even be that the process of talking with his
Dad about these issues shaped his viewpoint; but even then, a truly self-aware young Republican
should say, (b) “I spent a lot of time talking with my Dad about these issues and he convinced
me”. Explanation (b) permits an observer to infer that if the young Republican’s Dad had not
talked politics she might be a Democrat, an inference which explanation (a) doesn’t invite. 
The point is not that people are stupid, lie to survey questioners, or are always and
entirely clueless about what really caused their behavior. The point is just that the
potential exists for poor self-awareness because the self is not a self— it is (they are?) an
interaction of complicated mechanisms: The cortex is eager to make up a rationalization;
and the rationalization sounds reasonable even when outside observers know it’s wrong
(e.g., the experimenters know why the split-brain patients really waved). 
One way to think of the opposite of sophistication—naivete—is that it requires
persistent misforecasting of future behavior. Economic theorists seems to instinctively
regard this as impossible. But social psychologists have found precisely such persistent
misforecasting about future emotions and understand a lot about it (Dan Gilbert, et al) .
Another common claim is that when people misforecast repeatedly, they will learn that14
they do so, and wise up. Whether they do is an empirical question that shouldn’t be
prejudged by pure faith in learning from experience. Learning is guided by hippocampal
processing of information into long-term memories; when this process works poorly
people may fail to learn. More importantly, “top-down” encoding of information can
create biases in what is perceived which lead people to ignore unexpected surprises,
which means the feedback about mistakes necessary for learning is filtered out. 
Furthermore, many economic decisions are made once or are largely irreversible, and
have long-term effects (fertility choices, education choices, early savings choice). So
even if forecasting mistakes are learned over a person’s life, it may be too late for older
folks to reverse the long-run effects of their youthful mistakes (cf. “youth is wasted on
the young”).   
Endogeneous institutions: A theme which may emerge rapidly from thinking about
cognitive limits is the idea that collective actions or institutions emerge to both limit and
exploit these mistakes. An example is advertising. The standard theories of advertising
are embarassingly simple and make advertising executives burst out laughing. One theory
is that ads convey information about product price and quality. The most expensive ads—
on TV— often do not.
vii Another theory is that advertising “burns money” and signals to
consumers that the advertising firm’s products are so good that future sales will pay for
the ad costs many times over. But advertisements studiously avoid mentioning how much
the ad cost, which is the one thing the signaling theory predicts the advertisement should
mention, and the one thing it does not.  A useful way to think about advertising is that it
reveals an implicitly behavioral theory advertisers have about consumer decision making.
The nature of the advertising is a clue about how rational advertisers think people behave.
Rationalizing institutional behavior of this sort will be useful.
Another example illustrates how clever institutions understand and “debias” the
“disposition effect”. The disposition effect is a name for the fact that house owners and
people who bought stock shares tend to be reluctant to sell at an accounting loss (i.e., at a
selling price less than their purchase price; Shefrin & Statman, Odean, Weber and
Camerer, ). Except for small tax effects (which usually encourage selling losing stocks,
not keeping them), rational house and stock owners should ignore their purchase price15
and concentrate on their own future costs and benefits relative to a prevailing market
price. 
A large trading firm understands the powerful tug loss-aversion has on inhibiting
its traders from closing out trading positions which have lost money, clouding their
judgment.
viii So the firm takes two traders and swaps their positions: Sharon’s portfolio at
day-end on Tuesday is given to Colin to manage in the morning on Wednesday, and vice
versa. The new traders feel less emotional attachment to the new position they inherited
from the other trader (and ideally, don’t even know the prices at which the position was
initiated) and exhibit less or no disposition effect. The beauty of this scheme is that, from
the firm’s viewpoint, the swap is completely neutral—it does not change their aggregate
portfolio at all. But by swapping the positions the disposition effect is “debiased”. The
fact that the firm does this implies that they believe there is a disposition effect among
individual traders and create an institutional rule change to limit the firm’s harm from the
effect. Furthermore, the firm’s rule creats a novel type of scale economy: A firm with
more traders can do more firm-neutral swaps and, if the individual disposition effect
leads to mistakes, larger firms will earn more than smaller ones (ceteris paribus). 
A third and final example comes from Microsoft. Software designers and other
experts often suffer from a “curse of knowledge” (Camerer et al): They find it hard to
imagine how little others know about their area of expertise. So Microsoft found that its
software experts were surprised, and skeptical, about reports from help-line employees
about how buggy callers found Microsoft software to be. They installed a room with a
one-way mirror in which designers could watch typical users struggle with their software.
Microsoft cleverly pitted one bias against another: The designers’ curse of knowledge
was overcome by the power of vivid, salient information as they watched normal-looking
users struggle in front of their very eyes. The result was that designers realized how
difficult their software was for average people to comprehend (Heath, Larrick and
Klayman, cite).  
These examples show how firms’ investments in advertising, position-swapping, and
making consumer complaints evident, led to institutional changes which reveal an
implicit behavioral economics theory that explains the changes. So behavioral economics16
guides a positive analysis of what these firms are doing which might otherwise be
difficult to comprehend.
Missing psychology: An important area of active research is drawing new ideas from
psychology into behavioral economics. The research from 1980-2000 or so was heavily
influenced by work in psychology which was, in turn, driven by using anomalies relative
to rational choice models of judgment and preference. As a result, central ideas in
psychology which are not gracefully cast in terms of rational choice principles have been
neglected.
One example is categorization. Knowledge is clearly organized in categories (cite).
Furthermore, modern psychologists think categories are often organized around exemplar
or prototypical examples rather than defined by a list of features. (For example, a
perceived “scientist” is a person who shares traits with Albert Einstein, not a list of traits
like a job description.)  Concepts of categorization are useful for thinking about labor
markets (Fryer and Jackson, 2003?) and creating alternatives to Bayesian updating
(Mullainathan, 2003?). For example, Fryer and Jackson develop a theory of optimal
categorization under constraint which implies that minorities will be lumped in coarser
categories than majority members. Their theory is consistent with evidence of racial
discrimination. Mullainathan’s theory implies that new information can create changes in
beliefs that are much sharper than they would be in smoother Bayesian updating; this can
account for sharp “regime shifts” in perceptions of business cycles, financial market
volatility and so forth. 
Another interesting psychological concept, neglected in behavioral economics until
recently, is limited attention. Attention is the ultimate scarce cognitive resource. It is
possible to learn to attend to many stimuli at the same time—as busy financial-market
floor traders and cell-phone-using drivers do—but long-term memory suffers. Scarce
attention might be useful for explaining economic phenomena like organizational
structure (division of labor expands organizational attention but is constrained by the
need to coordinate) and advertising (which “grabs” attention). 
Neuroscience: “I are we”: A small group of behavioral economists are increasingly
convinced that economics could be usefully informed by neuroscience, a field which is17
exploding with insight because of advances in imaging brain activity and genetics (see
Camerer, Loewenstein, Prelec, 2003). 
Two simple insights are key: First, human are just primates with a thin layer of extra
cortex (used for long-term planning, understanding complex social structures and
symbolic systems like language and mathematics, and creating refined social emotions
like guilt and embarassment). This means we can learn a lot from similarities between
humans and other animals. For example, rats become addicted to every drug of abuse
humans become addicted to (cite). But human cortex means we can inhibit drug use even
when rats, for example, do not. (Rats voluntarily choose cocaine doses over food until
they die of starvation; most humans do not.)  The human-animal similarity also means the
explanation for distinctly human behavior must lie in the cortex; so we know where to
look in imaging studies.    
Second, neuroscience reminds us that the brain is complex. Look under the hood
of a car. There is a battery, carburetor, fan belt, oil pan, and so on. The car produces a
certain amount of basic behavior—e.g., moving forward rapidly—which does not require
intimate knowledge of what’s under the hood. But if you want to know why a car broke
down, or how to build a better one, you have to look under the hood. 
  The brain is the same way— it is an evolved (and developed, and socialized)
collection of modular subsystems, which interact to produce behavior. As a result, it is
unlikely that this brain would maximize any single function, like a utility function over
health-work-leisure-money tradeoffs. “I” is not an “I”— I are we. 
The breakthroughs in using neuroscience to do economics will come from simple
approaches which model behavior as the interaction of a small number of systems,
perhaps only two (which is, to a neuroscientist, grossly oversimplifed, but which
nonetheless might be the right level of abstraction for economics). 
The challenge is to pick two systems (a neurally plausible dichotomy), or more,
and generate precise predictions about the behavior which would result. One such model
could focus on the difference between “wanting” (preference revealed by choices) and
“liking” (how the brain response to actual consumption). I’ll say more about this below in
discussing welfare. 18
Another model focusses on “hot” and “cold” systems—loosely speaking,
emotions and cognition (Zajonc, etc). Loewenstein has argued that in “hot” states—
anger, hunger, fatigue, PMS in women, drug craving, depression— people become more
self- and immediately-focussed, and their “heat” inhibits thoughtful reasoning.  (And as
noted above, in hot states the brain is probably not fully self-aware that the hot state is
altering behavior.) 
Bernheim and Rangel (cites) use this distinction to create neurally-grounded
models of addiction and savings. They take the view that a person’s choices in the cold
state are the correct measure to be used for evaluating welfare. With this working
assumption, they are able to make precise welfare statements about policies (e.g.,
comparing taxation, regulated dispensation, and bans of drugs, and laissez-faire).
Laibson’s (2001) model of how environmental “cues” trigger demand for habit-forming
consumption is another elegant example showing that modelling of this sort *can* be
done and is insightful. 
Another useful two-system distinction is automatic (“habit”) vs. controlled
systems (see Benhabib and Bisin, 200?). Much of our behavior is clearly automatic
(involuntary reflexes like knee-jerks, breathing, and startle responses to fear), or becomes
automatized with practice (driving a car). Controlled systems require cortical deliberation
to override the automatic responses.
ix Automaticity is probably important in our reactions
to advertising, rapid (“quick and dirty”) reactions to racial and gender cues, and other
examples of economic interest. For example, Duflo and Saenz report that corporate
employees who accompany their friends to a forum to make health-program decisions are
more likely to change their own plans at the same time (cite). They don’t push this
interpretation (and their data are insufficient to validate my explanation) but is plausible
that going somewhere with a friend is an automatic response (“Hey, wanna come to
lunch? I have to stop at this health care thing and fill out a form real quick, it will only
take a few minutes”). Once faced with a form, some controlled deliberation results in a
choice. These employees made changes to their health care programs they *could* have
made in a controlled way (“I should really look at these new programs”) but which they
only made because they automatically went with a friend to the health-program signup
desk. 19
There is no reason to be anything but optimistic that something interesting will
come from neuroeconomic models of the interaction of hot-cold and automatic-controlled
systems. Why? First, because such models are scientifically deep. Technology changes
will generate an enormous amount of new data about the economizing brain and, after
perhaps after years of confusion and spurious results, some eventual insight. Second,
economic theorists love a technical challenge and rise to the occasion. The brain facts
provide a challenge because there a lot of modelling choices and will require some
ingenuity to choose models that are neurally reasonable, but solvable, and which lead to
new implications and eventually to policy.  Once the right way of posing questions if
found, models of this sort will surely prove no more difficult than the sort of deep general
equilibrium and delicate game-theoretic questions that are routinely answered in modern
economic theory. (Keep in mind, too, that the pace of research has already been
dramatic— problems in economic theory which were unsolved 20 years ago, and not
even imagined 40 years ago, are now assigned in problem sets to first-year graduate
students.)
IV. What about welfare? 
A central issue for policy is what behavioral economics can say about human
welfare, and which policies are welfare-enhancing. I’ll offer some precise ideas about
welfare, but start with two caveats. 
The first caveat is that virtually everyone doing behavioral economics agrees we
should go slowly in advocating policy change unless forced to make quick
recommendations. While behavioral economics in its modern form is about 20 years old,
it is a small field and much of our energy, until recently, has been consumed fending off
rational explanations of behavioral “anomalies”. Our thinking has also not designed to
precisely answer questions about welfare and policy but this is a good time in the
intellectual history of the field to say something. 
The second caveat is that rational theory is also an incomplete guide to policy.
Many policy prescriptions boil down to the law of demand— changing prices affects
behavior—which is agreed upon by neoclassical and behavioral economists because even
random behavior in the face of budget constraint will generate downward-sloping20
demand (Becker, 196*). The problem is not that the theory is wrong, but that it is
incomplete. It doesn’t tell us about how rapidly responses occur, which is important when
political pressures make it hard to impose short-run losses for long-run gains (think of
privitization efforts in former Communist countries, the appeal of Latin American
populists trying to push for painful reforms, etc.) The undeniable response of behavior to
prices also doesn’t tell us whether behavior is changed by policy variables other than
prices (e.g., anti-smoking campaigns, shifts in social norms, advertising, the influence of
catastrophes like 9/11 on risk perceptions, etc.)
There are at least three ways to think about welfare from a behavioral economics
viewpoint. 
First, we could draw some inspiration from other fields which comfortably accept
the idea that what people choose for themselves is not always in their best interest
(whether the latter is prescribed socially or personally). For example, psychiatrists have
concepts of mental health which they use to classify disorders which are treated with
therapies or drugs. They are implicitly using standards of ideal consumer welfare and are
trying to push behavior in that direction, often backed by the force of the law (which
should be understood in this context as a welfare standard endorsed by society). An
example in law is the “prudent man” rule in judging whether fudiciaries have acted
responsibly. This concept implicitly advocates a socially-agreed-upon ideal and punishes
deviations. 
Another example is self-improvement. Suppose an overweight person loves In-
and-Out Burgers and pizza delivered in large, fatty portions. A revealed preference view
would insist that since the burger and pizza aficionado chose them, he must have higher
utility for those foods than for salad. But suppose our hero presents at a clinic and says he
wants to cut back on burgers and pizza. Showing up reveals a meta-preference for
changing his revealed preferences. We should use his revealed meta-preference to
override day-to-day inferences from what he eats about what he really wants. 
Second, a useful language for complicating discussions about welfare was revived
by neo-Benthamite types of utility (Kahneman, ? ). A neuroscientist would distinguish at
at least four separate kinds of utility numbers that could, in principle, be measured in the
brain with techniques that are here or on the way: Remembered utility, anticipated utility,21
choice utility, and experienced utility. Remembered utility is what people recall liking;
anticipated utility is what they expect to like; choice utility is what they reveal by
choosing (classical revealed preference); and experienced utility is what they actually like
when they consume. Using revealed preferences to judge welfare is the same as assuming
that choice utility and experienced utility match up.  
In general, it might be exceptional that all four types of utilities match up. At
Caltech there are only four nearby places to eat lunch. Over a ten-year period my
remembered utilities, anticipated utilities, choice utilities, and experienced utilities for
different lunch meals have become rather well-matched (subject to a taste for variety-
seeking)   If I think about getting a bowl of Vietnamese pho at the Avery Center, I
remember accurately how it tasted the last time and, using that memory to imagine how it
will taste today, correctly anticipate what it will taste like today. So I choose it. The taste
experience corresponds to how I remembered it did and anticipated it would. 
The four types of utility will not match up when decisions are rare or the world
changes. In fact, neural evidence shows that “wanting” (anticipated utility) and “liking”
(experienced utility) are located in separate areas of the brain. This dissociation means
that in the short run, people might want what they won’t actually like (or won’t want
what they would actually like). Examples are easy to find. Some infants reveal a
preference for eating dirt: do they rationally anticipate liking it, or are they just exploring
a possible preference which wiser parents know their children don’t have? Addicts often
report drug craving (wanting) which lead to consumption (choosing) they do not find
pleasurable (don’t like). Compulsive shoppers buy goods (choose them) which they never
use (don’t get experienced utility from). 
Are average consumers more like me, rationally buying pho for lunch when they
are in the mood, or like dirt-eating infants, addicts and shopaholics? Presumably most
people in many choices are somewhere in between. When the decisions are momentous
and rare, like getting pregnant, deciding whether to go to college, signing up for pension
contributions, or buying a house, there is no reason to think the four types of utility will
necessarily match up. 22
Furthermore, there is a clear welfare criterion among the four kinds of utility:
What people should want is to maximize a combination of experienced utility and
remembered utility (because “consumption of experiences” matters too). 
Distinguishing types of utility also suggests a way to explain why society permits
institutions or a person’s relatives to overrule consumer sovereignty—denying that
choices match actual welfare—in interesting exceptions, like children and the mentally
ill. The idea that minors cannot make choices for themselves is rooted in an implicit
developmental psychology. The implicit idea is that brains which are not 18 years old yet
(for example) have not learned what is best for the owners of those young brains.
Psychiatric diagnosis of incompetence appeals to an idea that mental health experts can
overrule consumer sovereignty. The 18-year old and “psychiatrists said so” rules are
obviously coarse bright lines. A more refined analysis would presumably depend on an
expanded model in which people figure out what is good for them at some point, and we
(policymakers) can figure out in a reasonably unbiased way whether people have reached
that point of consumer sovereignty.
For example, one could imagine a diagnostic tool which presented people with
images of products and asked them to choose which they like most (measuring
“wanting”). Then we separately measure how much they like actually consuming those
goods (“liking”). If wanting and liking brain activation are different, a consumer could be
judged as incompetent (or not-yet-competent). This would probably work well for
children, and possibly for addicts and other classes of patients society currently denies
free choice to. These test cases aren’t proof that such a method would work more widely,
but they are proof that a restricted version of the method could scientifically support what
society does currently and might lead to reasonable changes in the current bright-line
procedures we apply.
A third way to think about welfare is provoked by the neural models described
above which recognize that the human brain is an interaction of multiples systems. In
these models welfare is usually defined as the choices made by one of the many systems.
For example, Bernheim and Rangel (cite) assume that the “cold” (anticipatory) system’s
choices are those which reflect a person’s true welfare. In systems with controlled and
automatic components, the controlled or deliberative choices reflect true welfare. It is23
undoubtedly hard for an economist steeped in the tradition of revealed preference to
adjudicate between which system’s choices should be used to judge welfare. But this is
only because the classical model gives you the luxury of avoiding such a choice, by
denying the multiple-system distinction.  
V. Conclusions
This essay lays out the case for shifting from conventional assumptions of
rationality to behavioral alternatives in doing economic analysis. Many of these
alternatives already extend the rationality model precisely by adding one or two
parameters so the instinctive fear that behavioral models are unfalsifiable or inevitably
unparsimonious is immediately proved wrong. A more difficult challenge provoked by
this conference is what the behavioral models might say about welfare and policy. 
Here is a summary of the key points:
•  Many rationality principles—the nature of preferences (including over gambles
and intertemporal streams), Bayesian probability, strategic thinking—can be
replaced by viable behavioral alternatives. These alternatives have the properties
economists like—formal structure, parsimony, and the ability to make predictions
about field phenomena and shape policy.
•  The “as if” defense of rationality principles is inherently incomplete, because it
does not prescribe precise mechanisms of learning, selection, advice-taking,
imitation, etc., which lead the principles to be true of human behavior. So it is
impossible to “disprove” the as-if view (since it is not a complete theory); the
goal, instead, is to flesh out conditions under which the as-if view holds and,
when it does not, what else will happen.
•  The idea that incorrect assumptions can lead to accurate predictions does not
vindicate “as if” rationality models because many predictions based on those
assumptions are clearly wrong (or at the very least, widely debated). Every
important area of economics has large anomalies that invite behavioral
explanations.
•  The next wave of debates will include: Predictions from behavioral alternatives
about field data;  the degree of self-awareness in human choice; the value of24
behavioral economics for explaining institutional choices (like advertising and
organizational design); incorporating ideas in psychology missing from the first
wave of behavioral economics (like categorization and limited attention); and
neuroscientific “multiple-system” approaches.
•  The behavioral view inescapably complicates welfare analysis, but only because
complete, transitive preferences inherently assume away the possibility that what
people choose and what is truly best for them may differ. 
•  In the behavioral view, welfare might be judged much as psychiatrists do (or by
using the meta-preferences people reveal by seeking treatment), by distinguishing
types of utility and taking experienced and remembered utilities as true welfare,
or by assuming that one of multiple brain systems—e.g., the “cold” or “controlled
(deliberative)” system—represents true welfare. 25
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Appendix: FAQ’s 
Aren’t mistakes transitory?
Not necessarily. Important mistakes can occur in rare decisions which have irreversible
lifetime consequences—choosing to skip college, have a child at a young age, study hard
as a child (in a highly path-dependent system like Japan’s), career choices, early
savings/consumption (bankruptcy early in life), crime (joining a gang), early childhood
eating habits, etc. 
Aren’t models of rationality inherently less precise than behavioral ones? 
No. There is a curious myth that weakening optimization means anything can
happen. This is simply wrong because precision can come from other kinds of
constraints. An obvious constraint is empirical: In choosing among alternative
assumptions about how rationality is limited, look to neighboring disciplines which have
explored alternatives carefully for decades. (To do otherwise is to succumb to the
mathematical conceit that brilliant people can deduce principles of actual behavior from
pure logic and deduction without actually watching what people do. Pure deduction has
never worked in any science—chemistry, astronomy, physics—and it is especially
unlikely to work in a social science, where the mathematicians doing the thinking are
likely to dismiss constrained reasoning of average folks who aren’t as smart as they are.)
A good constructive example is Gabaix and Laibson’s (2002?) model of limited
rationality in problems of searching for optimal paths through decision trees. Their model
is well-rooted in intuitions about procedurally rational search but is also precise. 
More interesting examples come from domains in which multiplicity of equilibria
arise from intertemporal considerations or strategic ones. E.g., Lucas (1986) notes that
there are often many rational expectations paths in money-price models; and in game
theory many interesting games have multiple equilibria (e.g., when players can
coordinate on a risky “good” equilibrium or a less risky “bad” one). Models with
adaptive expectations and limited iterated reasoning can actually be *more* precise in
these cases (e.g. Lucas, 1986; Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2002).27
Aren’t behavioral addenda just epicycles?
The “epicycle” critique of behavioral economics is an unfortunate
mischaracterization of both astronomical history *and* behavioral economics. Epicycles
were created to rescue a theory of planetary motion which failed to account for subtle
gravitational forces and hence made wrong predictions. The analogy to ideas in
behavioral economics is misguided because the new parameters and ideas in behavioral
economics were not concocted on the spot to explain small perturbations—instead, they
are deeply rooted in decades of very careful work by psychologist on how people behave,
and the departures from rational behavior they aim to explain are large, not small. To call
the behavioral economic theories which put the psychologists’ carefully-established data
to work “epicycles” is ignorantly to dismiss the entire disciplines that provide raw
material for behavioral modifications and to mischaracterize how behavioral economists
search for independent empirical verification of modifications to theory rather than
simply positing curve-fitting epicycles. 
Ironically, the besst producers of epicycles are rational-choice theorists who are
eager to explain away every lapse in rationality by an imputed “information cost” or an
evolutionary adaptation to a hypothetical EEA problem. Because costs and evolution are
not directly measurable, imputing missing costs and evolutionary adaptations in this way
is inherently tautological. (A good example is Posner and Fremling (Cite). I am a big
admirer of Judge Posner’s intellectual creativity in general, which is on great display in
this paper.) 
An alternative scientific model to epicycles is the periodic table of the elements in
chemistry. Nobody complains that new elements are epicyclic extensions of old ones
because they are clearly distinguished chemically. Psychological regularity is similar—a
list of effects are like elements which are believed by psychologists to be “chemically”
distinct, while made up of common elements (atoms, electrons, protons, etc.). Behavioral
economic theories work in a similar way. They use common “psychological elements” to
derive conceptually distinct explanations, and, importantly, to commit to new predictions
derived from the idea that chemical elements are distinct but combine in molecularly
regular ways. 28
Aren’t behavioral models inherently unparsimonious because they add parameters? 
No. The key test is not parsimony but precision and falsifiability. Many
behavioral models which weaken rationality do add parameters to measure a particular
kind of limit on rationality, but usually in a minimal way (e.g., adding a strength of
immediacy preference b to discounting models or a number of thinking steps τ in game
theory models). The prediction is that data will show some regularity in these new
parameters.
At the same time, behavioral economists are searching for *more* parsimony by
seeking regularities which provide a unified view of social science and natural science.
For example, neuroscience uses evidence from humans with brain damage, PET
scanning, fMRI imaging, EEG wave measurement, self-report, and the “animal model”
(primates, rats) to triangulate on a single hypothesis that can explain regularities in all
these types of data, which is extremely parsimonious.  
The rational-choice explanations of different behavioral anomalies, in contrast,
often explain different anomalies with contradictory assumptions. For example, utility
over money gains is assumed to be convex to explain gambling, and concave to explain
the large equity premium in stock returns compared to bonds. Adding specialized ad hoc
assumptions to explain anomalies in different domains is precisely the opposite of what
scientists generally mean by parsimony. 
Won’t markets correct individual irrationality?
Not necessarily. The crucial insight is that behavior in markets is a kind of
intellectual and financial arms race in which forces punishing mistakes, or offering
advice to those who make mistakes, are matched (or overmatched) by forces that exploit
mistakes. Education, rehabilitation, advice markets, and so forth probably do improve the
ability of people to save and spend  wisely, and resist temptation; but the incentive of
individuals to create corporations which pool knowledge about mistakes and exploit them
may be even greater. Which force wins out depends on the relative profitability of selling29
mistake-correction and exploiting mistakes, as well as scale and scope economies in
creating organizations that provide corrective and exploitative services.
An example is food consumption. The diet-fad and nutrition-advice industry have
grown dramatically in the US in recent years, so people surely know more about
nutritional content and what they should eat.  At the same time, fast food consumption
and measured obesity (and associated illnesses, such as heart disease) have grown too
(and will surely become more important as less-developed economies move beyond
subsistence diets toward a point where their citizens can afford to get fat). The average 7-
13 year old eats hamburgers about 6 times per week (more often than adults);
McDonald’s buys more pork than any company in America, even though pork is not
served on their dinner and lunch menus (surprise: it’s breakfast sausage; Schlossberg,
200?). From a welfare point of view, it is convenient to conclude that if people (pre-teens
included?) eat so much fast food it must have high utility. But if the crucial goal is
lifetime utility or, equivalently, about making the tradeoff between eating a juicy
hamburger now and dying sooner several decades later, the conclusion that children
eating six hamburgers a week are behaving optimally is wrong. 
It is easy to construct examples in which the profits to exploitation of mistakes
exceed those from advice about avoiding mistakes. If people are naive about their own
future tastes—e.g., they act as if they will switch to a healthier diet in a few years--
exploiters will earn more profits. In fact, exploiters of different sorts might get paid
twice. Suppose a diet-fad ad promised you could eat absolutely anything you want and
still lose weight (as some do). Gullible people would pay for the advice (paying once)
and would pay again in future health costs when the diet doesn’t work. 
Another example is depression and suicide, typically an extreme result of
depression. Suppose suicide results from depression which includes a forecasting bias
(those who have “suicidal ideation” mistakenly think life will always be terrible, and
hence kill themselves in a cost-benefit calculation which is rational given their forecast).
Who earns more: Sleeping pill salesmen, or a therapist who counsels against killing
oneself? Therapists *should* earn more but won’t always. Better products only sell if
people are good shoppers. People contemplating suicide probably aren’t.  30
Of course, the issue for policymakers is which regulatory interventions help.
Beyond the usual justifications for government— internalizing or correcting externalities,
supply of public goods, productive enforcement of property rights—we can add a
category of  “protecting the weak”. Governments already do this by protecting children,
the mentally ill, the uninformed, and by banning products. Behavioral economists
suggest, very tentatively, that normal people are also weak in regular ways. Then the
moral basis for protections might be extended further, when research clearly establishes
the boundaries of weakness (succumbing to temptation, processing complex information
badly) and points to simple robust fixups (e.g., Camerer et al, 03; Sunstein and Thaler,
03). 
If mistakes are so common, why are developed economies so (relatively) productive,
people so long-lived, etc.?  
These successes may be partly a result of advantages of scale and diversity, rather
than average intellectual capacities of participants; so success of entire economies does
not imply much about how smart average participants are. We can also afford mistakes. If
people in developed economies eat too much (relative to a lifetime-maximizing diet) they
just die a few years earlier than they would have, but live longer than if they lived in
poverty. This is not so in say poverty-line agricultural societies—and indeed, rates of
business failure, death etc are higher in those societies. This doesn’t mean we should not
be trying to avoid unfortunate outcomes from rationality limits. Limits on rationality also
reallocate wealth & welfare; the consequences of these reallocations may be deemed
inherently unfair by societies. 
Aren’t we evolved to behave rationally? 
No. We are evolved to reproduce our genes; rationality principles are based on
logic, external arguments (e.g., Dutch book rationales for coherence of probabilities), s.
Furthermore most biological evolution ocurred in an environment long ago (often called
the “EEA”, the environment of evolution of our ancestors). Ideally, evolutionary
arguments about how our brains adapted should be an argument in favor of behavioral
ideas about rationality limits on rationality, temptation, and self interest, rather than a31
defense of hyper-rationality. In the EEA, the human brain didn’t need to plan so far ahead
(long life is a recent phenomenon) or to deal with monogamy, widespread availability of
food, etc. This doesn’t mean it is rational, in modern terms, to eat so much fat—it’s not in
terms of traditional criterion of achieving goals through best possible means, but it is in
terms of using mechanisms adapted to an ancestral environment to cope in a modern one
(“ecological rationality”).  
The central issue is whether it is necessary to have an evolutionary foundation for
anything we discover in behavioral economics, and whether evolutionary modeling
actually produces new insight and falsifiable predictions. There are many reasons to be
skeptical. Effective evolutionary modelling requires creating premises (evolutionary
mechanisms of transmission and a good description of the EEA) which can never be well
grounded empirically because they rely so heavily on archeological speculation.
Furthermore, much science progresses without knowing precisely where original
mechanisms really came from (e.g., the origin of life, the origin of the universe, how
evolution could have created such dramatically “punctuated” changes in species).
Scientists in those fields realize how difficult it is to pin down true origins.  32
Endnotes
                                                
i  I hope my degree of  presumption to speak on behalf of a field is just about right (he said presumptively).
Behavioral economists do not meet in a cabal to decide on our collective positions and vote. Hardly! It is
true that many of us meet in intellectual forums regularly, at first as common-enemy dissenters from a
rational-choice view, and later as scientists with eclectic overlapping interests. But we divide along many
intellectual and methodological lines, and ebb and flow between them. A practical definition of what makes
an economist behavioral is how much attention she or he pays to facts established in neighboring sciences
as constraints on modelling. Behavioral economists pay a lot of attention because we believe in a division
of labor (which is, ironically, a simple economic concept): We believe that somebody who knows a ton
about, say, human memory can save you a lot of trouble in getting to the truth if you talk to them (mostly
listening) before you lift pen to paper to write down a model of memory with economic implications.
(Since good science is hard, ignoring cheaply-available advice cannot be economical in terms of the
intellectual production function which creates good economics.) As a result, in a behavioral economics
seminar you get extra points for actually knowing facts and using them to justify your approach; in many
other economics seminars you don’t get points: Instead, people regard such an empirical justification
quizzically, or actually debate facts with you (usually brimming with a surprising combination of
confidence and ignorance), or give extra points for  a model which is so bizarrely detached from reality that
it poses special technical challenges which show prowess, as if a triple flip was the better way to get into a
pool than diving straight in. Triple flips are hard but the goal is to get into the pool.
ii An interesting exception is macro models which take economy-wide factors like capital and labor as
inputs without tying them explicitly to microfoundations. Detached models of this sort are subject to their
own criticisms (but the detachment in them is also undoubtedly useful for some purposes).
iii Sophisticated vs. naive forecasting notwithstanding.
iv In the movie “Almost Famous”, set in the 1970s, a touring rock band crowds around a fax machine and
gapes as a page prints out. One of them explains that the machine transmits a printed page over a phone
line...``and it only takes 3 minutes a page!”. The line is funny precisely because we forget how bad old
technology is compared to new (a kind of assimilation or “overwriting” bias in memory similar to hindsight
bias and curse of knowledge).  If the same is true of behavioral and rational modelling, we will soon look
back at quaint rational modelling with a mixture of embarassment and nostalgia.
v In the movie “Almost Famous”, set in the 1970s, a touring rock band crowds around a fax machine and
gapes as a page prints out. One of them explains that the machine transmits a printed page over a phone
line...``and it only takes 3 minutes a page!”. The line is funny precisely because we forget how bad old
technology is compared to new (a kind of assimilation or “overwriting” bias in memory similar to hindsight
bias and curse of knowledge).  If the same is true of behavioral and rational modelling, we will soon look
back at quaint rational modelling with a mixture of embarassment and nostalgia.
vi Laibson, epstein, andrea wilson limited memory.
vii A current ad for a fast-food chain’s chicken sandwich describes a “chicken” husband cowering as his
wife urges him to investigate the suspicious sounds downstairs, which sound like a burglar to her. The tail
end of the ad mentions the chain’s chicken sandwich briefly. Nothing is said about the sandwich’s price or
quality.  Presumably the advertiser’s goal was to associate the emotional valence of the term “chicken”, in
an amusing and memorable way, with the chain’s new sandwich.
viii Chris Mayer told me this story.33
                                                                                                                                                
ix In “Stroop tasks” an automatic response must be overidden and the failure to do so leads to errors. A
classic example is listing a color word and asking the subject to name the color of the ink the word is
written in. If the word is “red” people often answer “red” when the correct answer is black.